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I. INTRODUCTION
One evening in July 2009, 26-year-old Nick Bills parked his pickup
truck outside a bar in St. Marys, West Virginia.1 He extracted the synthetic
prescription painkiller fentanyl from a patch designed to slowly release the
medicine through the skin, mixed it with water, and injected the drug directly
into his veins.2 Bills began using prescription pain medicine after undergoing
surgery for a shattered elbow.3 Doctors prescribed him so many pills, the
bottles "covered the top of the refrigerator .... ", At first he gave extra pills
away to friends, but after a while, his own addiction took hold.5 Eventually,
popping pills became shooting up fentanyl in a parking lot.6 Nick Bills died in
that parking lot on July 19, 2009, and he, as well as thousands of others over
the last decade, are tragic examples of the consequences that accompany a rise
in prescription drug abuse.7
From 1992 to 2008, F rescription drug overdose deaths in the United
States have more than tripled. For more than a decade, deaths from drug abuse
have surpassed homicide, suicide, and gunshot wounds as causes of death; this
upsurge was attributed largely to the increased abuse of prescription drugs.9
The increase in prescription drug abuse has had a particularly devastating
impact in Appalachia, exemplified by West Virginia, which led the nation in
I Alison Knezevich, Prescription Drug Abuse Takes Deadly Toll in W. Va., CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 2011, http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201101151175.
2 Id.; Fentanyl Transdermal Patch, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a601202.html#how (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).




7 Id.; Miles D. Schreiner, A Deadly Combination: The Legal Response to America's
Prescription Drug Epidemic, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 529, 530--31 (2012).
8 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, POLICY IMPACT: PRESCRIPTION PAINKILLER OVERDOSES 3-4
(2011) [hereinafter POLICY IMPACT], available at http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/
pdf/policyimpact-prescriptionpainkillerod.pdf. Prescription painkiller overdose deaths rose from
less than 4,000 in 1990 to 14,800 in 2008. Id.
9 Schreiner, supra note 7, at 530-31.
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overdose deaths per capita in 2010.10 West Virginia's overdose death rate rose
from 6.2 per 100,000 residents in 2000, to 28.9 per 100,000 in 2010.11 West
Virginia was one of 29 states where drug overdose deaths exceeded auto
accident deaths, highlighting the nationwide impact of the rise in prescription
drug abuse.12 Multiple factors have fueled the increase in abuse, including a
growing acceptance of opioids, such as oxycodone and hydrocodone, to treat
pain and the resulting increase in doctors' willingness to prescribe the drugs,
sometimes to excessive levels; "doctor shopping" by patients; and improper
prescriptions by physicians, sometimes through clinics dubbed "pill mills'
13
due to the prescribing practices. 14
The states and the federal government responded to this rise in
prescription drug abuse with widespread implementation of state prescription
drug monitoring programs ("PDMPs") 15 and federal monitoring legislation
signed into law in 2005.16 PDMPs are electronic databases that collect and store
information regarding prescription drugs and patients, including patients'
names, addresses, drug histories, prescribers, and dispensers. 17 Health care
providers and law enforcement have used these programs to combat the rise in
10 Reid Wilson, Drug Overdoses Kill More People than Auto Accidents in 29 States, WASH.




13 See Abuse of Controlled Prescribed Substances Continues to be Nation's Fastest-Growing
Drug Problem, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES HANDBOOK NEWSL., Jan. 2014, at 2 (providing a
concise description of characteristic pill mill practices).
14 Laxmaiah Manchikanti, Prescription Drug Abuse: What Is Being Done to Address This
New Drug Epidemic? Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and
Human Resources, 9 PAIN PHYSICIAN 287, 299-300 (2006); Barry Meier, A New Painkiller
Crackdown Targets Drug Distributors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/10/18/business/to-fight-prescription-painkiller-abuse-dea-targets-distributors.htm?page
wanted=all [hereinafter Meier, Painkiller Crackdown]; Barry Meier, Tightening the Lid on Pain
Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/health/opioid-
painkiller-prescriptions-pose-danger-without-oversight.html?pagewanted=all.
15 See KAREN BLUMENSCHEIN ET AL., KENTUCKY ALL SCHEDULE PRESCRIPTION ELECTRONIC
REPORTING PROGRAM (KASPER) EVALUATION TEAM, REVIEW OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
MONITORING PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2010), available at
http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/85989824-1030-4aa6-91 e 1-7f9e3ef68827/0/Kasperevaluation
pdmpstatusfinalreport6242010.pdf.
16 Gloria Goodale, Prescription Drug Abuse Surged 400 Percent in Past Decade, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, July 15, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0715/
Prescription-drug-abuse-surged-400-percent-in-past-decade.
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drug abuse, but the programs have raised Fourth Amendment privacy concerns
for patients relating to the access and use of PDMP information.1
8
This Note argues that patients have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in their personally identifiable PDMP data, and the Fourth Amendment requires
that law enforcement obtain a warrant before accessing personally identifiable
PDMP data. In addition, it also advocates for the utilization of other means to
protect patient privacy, such as exempting PDMP data from public records
laws, and imposing civil and/or criminal penalties for the wrongful access, use,
and dissemination of PDMP data. Lastly, the Note proposes a solution that
gives law enforcement warrantless access to de-identified PDMP data so as to
balance the need to enforce drug laws with patients' expectation of privacy.
Part II of this Note provides background information, including an
outline of PDMPs, how they started, how they operate, and an examination of
studies relating to their effectiveness. Part III also provides background by
discussing the law relevant to this Note's analysis, including Fourth
Amendment precedent, extra-constitutional privacy laws, and the
administrative subpoena power. Part IV applies the law to PDMP data,
demonstrating through its analysis that patients have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in their personally identifiable PDMP data, and the Fourth Amendment
requires that law enforcement obtain a warrant before accessing personally
identifiable PDMP data. Finally, Part V proposes measures that could help to
effectively balance the patients' privacy interests with the government's
interest in enforcing controlled substance laws.
II. A BRIEF OUTLINE OF STATE PDMPs
In order to help the reader understand the importance of this Note's
later privacy analysis relating to PDMPs, this Part describes what PDMPs are,
how they operate, and privacy concerns they may raise. Section A of this Part
discusses the history of state PDMPs, and some of the varied particularities of
the programs. Section B examines some studies conducted by individual states
that have measured the effectiveness of their programs, as well as some
potential issues that these programs create. Finally, Section C of this Part
discusses criticism and litigation that has arisen as PDMPs have been utilized
for the purpose of obtaining evidence for criminal prosecutions.
18 Christian Gaston, Oregon Sues DEA Over Access to Patient Drug Records,
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A. A Brief History of State PDMPs and Common Variations Among the
Programs
Between 1939-when California created the first PDMP-and 1992,
ten states19 passed laws creating PDMPs. 20 In the 22 years since, 39 other states
and the District of Columbia enacted legislation to create PDMPs. 21 Although
the federal monitoring program, the National All Schedule Prescription
Electronic Reporting Act ("NASPER"), was passed and signed into law in
2005, it has yet to be funded.22 If fully funded and implemented, NASPER
would establish PDMPs in all 50 states and allow doctors to access databases in
23neighboring states. NASPER received $2 million per year in appropriations in
2009 and 2010, which it used to fund grants to help states implement and
operate their programs.24
PDMPs generally serve multiple specific purposes, 25 generally aimed at
reducing prescription drug abuse, while ensuring access for those with
legitimate medical needs.2 6 This Note specifically addresses privacy issues
relating to the purpose of PDMPs as a "tool that serves the needs of [law
enforcement]. 27 These monitoring programs vary from state to state in terms
of the drugs they monitor, how they collect and distribute the information, who
19 The first ten states to pass PDMPs between 1939 and 1992 were California (1939), Hawaii
(1943), Illinois (1958), Idaho (1967), Pennsylvania (1972), New York (1972), Rhode Island
(1978), Texas (1982), Michigan (1988), and Oklahoma (1990). BLUMENSCHErN ETAL., supra note
15, at 6-7.
20 Id. at2.
21 NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE, ADDICTION
AND DIVERSION: OVERVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY INITIATIVES, PART 1: STATE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS (PMPS) 6 (2014) [hereinafter NAMSDL], available
at http://www.namsdl.org/library/884CB2C5-1372-636C-DD54DCCOOFD31313/.
22 Richard M. Reisman et al., Prescription Opioid Usage and Abuse Relationships: An
Evaluation of State Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Efficacy, 3 SUBSTANCE ABUSE: RES.
& TREATMENT 41, 50 (2009).
23 Id.
24 KRISTIN M. FINKLEA ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R42593, PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING
PROGRAMS 16 (2013), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=728239.
25 These purposes include:
(1) to support access to legitimate medical use of controlled substances, (2)
to help identify and deter or prevent drug abuse and diversion, (3) to facilitate
and encourage the identification, intervention with, and treatment of persons
addicted to prescription controlled substances, (4) to help inform public
health initiatives through outlining of use and abuse trends, and (5) to help
educate individuals about PMPs and prescription drug use, abuse, diversion,
and addiction.
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has access to the information, the agency responsible for administering the
program, how the program is funded, who is required to report information, and
whether participation is mandatory.2 8
All programs monitor at least Schedule II drugs, most monitor drugs
in Schedules II-IV, and 17 monitor non-scheduled or non-controlled drugs. 30
Almost all programs authorize both prescribers (doctors) and dispensers
(pharmacists) to use and access the information. 3' Almost all programs also
authorize law enforcement to use the program to obtain evidence in criminal
investigations, but states vary with regard to the scope of access afforded to law
enforcement.32 Some states, such as Oregon, require law enforcement to have a
search warrant or a showing of probable cause before gaining access to
information from the program.3 3 Others require that the request for information
be pursuant to an active investigation. Pennsylvania, which houses its
program within the Office of the Attorney General, requires law enforcement to
obtain approval from the attorney general to obtain information from the
program.3p A few states have conducted evaluations of their programs, with
mixed results.36
B. Studies of PDMP Effectiveness
Some models that evaluate the effects of PDMPs have indicated that
the programs generally reduce the supply of Schedule II pain relievers and
stimulants. 3 Maine found its program to be effective for identifying patients
that were doctor shopping, recognizing and treating individuals addicted to
prescription drugs, and protecting patient confidentiality.38 Maine's evaluation
28 Id.
29 The Federal Drug Enforcement Administration organizes controlled substances into five
schedules, I-V. Schedule I contains illegal drugs with no legitimate medical purpose, Schedule II
contains the most dangerous and addictive drugs that may be prescribed for legitimate medical
purposes, and the drugs in the remaining schedules decrease in their danger, abuse potential, and
addiction potential from Schedule III-V. Drug Scheduling, DEA, http://www.justice.gov/
dea/druginfo/ds.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
30 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 13; BLUMENSCHEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 6-7.
31 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 25.




36 BLUMENSCHEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 20-23.
37 RONALD SImEONE & LYNN HOLLAND, SIMEoNE ASSOCIATES INC., AN EVALUATION OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS 19-20 (2006), available at http://www.simeone
associates.com/simeone3.pdf.
38 BLUMENSCHEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 20-21.
[Vol. 117
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also indicated that the program did not produce a chilling effect on the number
of prescriptions doctors were writing.39
However, a study in Virginia found that its program was producing a
chilling effect for Schedule I1 prescriptions.4 ° Virginia's study also
demonstrated a low utilization rate of the program by prescribers, dispensers,
and other authorized users; regardless, 68% of physicians still said the program
"is useful for monitoring their patients' prescription history and decreasing the
incidence of 'doctor shopping. ' ' 41 Finally, an evaluation of Kentucky's PDMP
found a high, and likely increasing, utilization of the program; no chilling effect
on prescriptions; and that the program was effective at helping to identify abuse
and gathering information during criminal investigations.
Multiple organizations have produced best practice guidelines for
PDMPs or model PDMP laws.43 These groups generally agree on what the best
practices for PDMPs consist of, including mandatory reporting and use;
distribution of proactive alerts regarding suspicious activity; interstate sharing
of data; and penalties for unlawful access, use, and disclosure. 4 However, these
groups' views differ somewhat regarding what drugs should be monitored; how
states should evaluate their PDMPs; and whether all aspects such as enrollment,
reporting, and utilization should be mandatory.45
The generally recognized efficacy of the programs has led to many
commenters arguing that these programs should be expanded and enhanced to
decrease diversion, abuse, and the overall number of drugs prescribed.46 The
programs can help reduce prescription drug abuse at the front end, by
informing doctors' prescribing decisions based on their patients' prescription
histories. Despite the benefits, PDMPs have raised some concerns.
39 Id. at21.
40 Id. at 21-22.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 22-23.
43 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 12-13.
44 Id. at 11-13.
45 Id. at 13-17.
46 See, e.g., Hallam Gugelmann & Jeanmarie Perrone, Can Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs Help Limit Opioid Abuse?, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2258, 2259 (2011) ("Physician,
patient, and policy maker advocacy is needed at the state and national level to enhance and
expand these monitoring programs."); Christopher M. Jones et al., Pharmaceutical Overdose
Deaths, United States, 2010, 309 J. AM. MED. ASW'N 657, 659 (2013) ("Tools such as
prescription drug monitoring programs... can help clinicians to identify risky medication use
and inform treatment decisions, especially for opioids and benzodiazepines."); Reisman et al.,
supra note 22, at 50 ("This study supports the efficacy of PDMPs and provides statistical support
for establishing PDMPs in all states.").
47 See Gugelmann & Perrone, supra note 46.
2014]
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C. Criticism of and Litigation Involving PDMPs
The wave of legislation creating PDMPs has not been without its
criticisms. In Florida, one of the last states to pass PDMP legislation,48 critics
of the program cite concerns over patient privacy, cost, and potential loopholes
in the legislation.49 Privacy concerns center around the vulnerability of PDMPs
as electronic databases, which are susceptible to cyber criminals 50 and
unfettered access by law enforcement agencies.5 '
These concerns have been reinforced by litigation in Florida arising out
of the disclosure of prescription information by law enforcement to defense
counsel during discovery following a sting operation. 2 A Daytona Beach
defense attorney named Michael Lambert sued the state over a disclosure of his
personal PDMP data. Lambert brought the suit against Florida State Attorney
C.J. Larizza after Lambert's name appeared on a list of 3,300 individuals
whose drug histories, doses, pharmacies, and home addresses were provided to
five defense attorneys. 3 The defense attorneys represented criminal defendants
implicated following the sting operation, which targeted a prescription drug
trafficking ring. 4 Lambert contends that a large majority of the names on the
list did not need to be disclosed, and the state should have redacted all the
names other than those of the six accused individuals.55 Lambert's case drew
48 See Ashley Dutko, Note, Florida's Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse: Prescription
Drug Monitoring Program, 34 NOVA L. REV. 739, 754-58 (2010); Arian Campo-Flores, Fight
Over a Fix for Florida's 'Pill Mills,' WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052748703961104576148753447131080; Janet Zink & Richard Martin,
Gov. Rick Scott Wants to Repeal Florida's Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, TAMPA BAY
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/news/health/gov-rick-scott-wants-to-repeal-
floridas-prescription-drug-monitoring/1 150411.
49 Dutko, supra note 48, at 754-58; Zink & Martin, supra note 48.
50 See NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 15.
51 Dara Kam, Critics Skeptical of Official Moves to Safeguard Florida Prescription




54 Id. The investigation determined that the ring was using false and stolen identities to obtain
prescription drugs. Id.
55 Id. The six accused individuals were initially suspected of committing forgery when the
records were requested. Following the disclosure and verification by doctors, the investigation
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the attention of the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"),56 which also
litigated a case in Oregon relating to the use of information from a PDMP. 57
The case in Oregon involved a conflict between state and federal law.58
Oregon law requires law enforcement to obtain a search warrant, with a
showing of probable cause, to access information from the state's PDMP.5 9
Federal law allows certain deputies of the Attorney General to issue
administrative subpoenas for information "relevant or material" to an
investigation "relating to his functions ... with respect to controlled
substances. 6 ° In Oregon, the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") had
been attempting to use this administrative subpoena power to access the state's
PDMP data without a warrant. 61 A United States Magistrate ordered the state to
comply with the subpoena issued in this case, but Oregon responded by suing
the Drug Enforcement Administration in federal district court.62 Oregon
contended that its law requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before
accessing PDMP data preempted the federal law allowing the Attorney General
to issue administrative subpoenas during investigations.63 The ACLU filed a
Complaint in Intervention 64 with four patients and a doctor as plaintiffs, 65 but
the Complaint in Intervention remained silent on the preemption issue. 66 The
ACLU joined the suit only to enforce the plaintiff-interveners' "Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy in their protected health information." 67 The court
56 Frank Fernandez, Attorney: Prescription Drug Database Unconstitutional, DAYTONA
BEACH NEWS-J. (June 12, 2013), http://www.news-journalonline.com/article/20130612/
NEWS/306129977.
57 Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. DEA, 998 F. Supp. 957 (D. Or. Mar. 31,
2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/motion to-intervene-granted.pdf (Order
Granting Motion to Intervene).
58 Gaston, supra note 18.
59 OR. REV. STAT. § 431.966(2)(a)(D) (2014).
60 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) (2012).
61 Complaint in Intervention for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Or. Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program v. DEA, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2014) (No. 3:12-cv-02023-HA),
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2013.04.10 -doc-18 - complaint-in-inter
vention.pdf.
62 Gaston, supra note 18.
63 See id.
64 A complaint in intervention allows a party that was not originally part of a lawsuit to join
the suit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
65 Complaint in Intervention, supra note 61, at 3-6.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 3-6, 12.
2014]
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agreed with Oregon and the ACLU, ruling that the DEA could not use the
administrative subpoena on Fourth Amendment grounds. 68
These cases illustrate one of the primary issues with PDMPs and raise
important questions about the purpose and implementation of PDMPs. Some of
these questions include: How can states effectively balance the privacy interests
of patients against the interests of law enforcement in investigating the illegal
use and distribution of prescriptions drugs? Can administrative subpoenas from
federal agencies be used in place of a warrant in violation of state law? Should
law enforcement have to obtain a warrant before accessing information even in
states that do not require a warrant? Courts will have to apply at least some
level of Fourth Amendment analysis when dealing with these questions. The
following Part outlines the law this Note applies in its analysis in Parts IV-V.
III. THE APPLICABLE LAW: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, HEALTHCARE-
SPECIFIC PRIVACY LAWS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA
This Part addresses the constitutional precedent, statutory provisions,
and professional oath this Note applies in its analysis. First, Section A discusses
general Fourth Amendment precedent. This discussion includes a description of
what the Fourth Amendment protects, what constitutes a legitimate expectation
of privacy, and what the government must show in order to conduct a search
and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Next, Section B examines Fourth
Amendment precedent relating specifically to health information. Section C
discusses extra-constitutional privacy protections for health information
including HIPAA laws, doctor-patient privilege, and privacy protections
included in state PDMP laws. Finally, Section D outlines the administrative
subpoena power held by the Attorney General under the Controlled Substances
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 876, and some court precedent relating to this power.
With these various laws, this Note will demonstrate, through its
analysis in Part IV, that patients have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their personally identifiable PDMP data, and the Fourth Amendment requires
that law enforcement obtain a warrant before accessing personally identifiable
PDMP data. First, a general overview of the Fourth Amendment, what it
protects, and how it protects.
A. The Fourth Amendment Generally
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
citizens the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.,, 69 The Supreme Court of the
68 Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. DEA, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (D. Or.
2014).
69 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
[Vol. 117
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United States has consistently recognized that the Fourth Amendment, as well
as other constitutional amendments, establishes an inferred right to privacy.70
Indeed, as early as 1886 courts have held that the Fourth Amendment applies to
"all invasions on the part of the government or its employees on the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of life.",
71
The Fourth Amendment does not simply protect property or places
from unreasonable searches and seizures; it also protects people, and its reach
is not limited to physical intrusions into a private place.7 Privacy interests
often involve a variety of more specific interests held by individuals, including
"the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and ... the
interest in independence when making certain kinds of important decisions.,
73
PDMPs implicate the former of these interests by collecting and storing large
quantities of information relating to these "personal matters."
The Fourth Amendment "strikes a balance between individual citizen's
interest in conducting certain affairs in private, and general public's interest in
subjecting possible criminal activity to intensive investigation.., by securing
for each individual private enclave a 'zone' bounded by an individual's own
reasonable expectations of privacy. 74 When a zone of privacy is implicated,
courts must examine the exact governmental interests served and balance them
against the specific invasion of privacy.75
This privacy analysis will only apply if the individual has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.76 An individual's subjective expectation of privacy is
legitimate if it is "one that society is prepared to recognize as [objectively]
'reasonable.' 77 The legitimate expectation of privacy must also have a source
beyond the Fourth Amendment, "either by reference to the concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted
by society."" To determine whether an asserted privacy interest is reasonable,
the court considers whether the person invoking the protection "took normal
70 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 411-20 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (citing several
cases identifying a right to privacy, including Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1949); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); and Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
71 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
72 Id.
73 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
74 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
75 Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989).
76 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978)).
77 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
78 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12.
2014]
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precautions to maintain his privacy-that is, precautions customarily taken by
those seeking privacy.
79
The Court has also been steadfast in its assertion that such privacy
rights are not absolute.8 ° States may make certain reasonable intrusions into
these rights in the furtherance of a legitimate government interest.81 Typically,
a search or seizure must be supported by a warrant issued upon a showing of
probable cause.8' There are some exceptions to this requirement, such as the
"exigent circumstances 83 exception commonly used in the context of traffic
stops 84 or the "special needs" exception invoked when the search serves
government interests "beyond the normal need for law enforcement."85 One
example of a situation where an "intrusion serves governmental needs, beyond
normal need for law enforcement" is suspicionless urine testing to detect drug
use in customs employees.86 The government is also able to assert additional
interests, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, in the context of
administrative searches, where the regulated entity has a lessened expectation
of privacy, and the government's interest in the regulatory scheme outweigh
any expectation of privacy that may exist.
8 7
Thus, the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's privacy, and
prevents the government from making arbitrary intrusions into both physical
and intangible "zones of privacy." This usually means law enforcement must
get a warrant before invading such a zone, but this requirement and the Fourth
Amendment rights underlying it are not absolute. These rights have often been
applied to the doctor-patient relationship and health or healthcare information
in general, specifically with regard to laws prohibiting and regulating
79 Id. at 152; see also United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1086 (1981) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12, 152-53).
80 See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656; Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Roe v.
Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
81 See e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656; Torres, 442 U.S. at 465; Roe, 364 F. Supp. at 536.
82 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
83 Exigent circumstances are defined for the purpose of this Note as "a situation in which a
police officer must take immediate action to effectively make an arrest, search, or seizure for
which probable cause exists, and thus may do so without first obtaining a warrant." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 296 (10th ed. 2014). The most common example of exigent circumstances are
searches of vehicles during traffic stops. A police officer with probable cause may search a
vehicle without first getting a warrant. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
84 Ross, 456 U.S. at 798, 799-800, 816.
85 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 651-52 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
86 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
87 See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (allowing periodic warrantless inspections of
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abortions,8 laws requiring doctors to report treatment information to receive
public healthcare funds, 89 laws establishing PDMPs, 90 and programs that
disclose medical information to law enforcement. 9
B. The Fourth Amendment and Medical Information
Courts have typically held that individuals have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in their healthcare information. Once the court finds that
a zone of privacy or legitimate expectation of privacy exists, the court must
balance the asserted government interest against the specific invasion of
privacy.92 Courts will examine several factors relating to the invasion of
privacy to determine the extent of the intrusion and whether the intrusion is
reasonable in light of the expectation of privacy or it is outweighed by it.
93
Certain places, activities, or information in which individuals have a heightened
expectation of privacy trigger a presumption under the Fourth Amendment that
law enforcement must obtain a warrant before intruding on one of those zones,
allowing courts to dispense with the balancing test all together.94 However, it is
reasonable to infer that this presumption still represents a balancing of the state
interests against the invasion of privacy 9 5-a balancing, in which the
government has an extremely difficult burden to overcome if it hopes to
circumvent the warrant requirement. 96 Still, not all government officials are
88 See Thomburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986),
overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(invalidating parts of a Pennsylvania law on Fourth Amendment grounds because the law
required the collection of specific information about women receiving abortions, which could
lead to their identification, and the information was made available to the public). But see Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court in Roe v. Wade did not base its decision on the Fourth
Amendment, but rather on other forms of privacy rights secured by the Fourteenth and Ninth
Amendments. Id.
89 See Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 136-37 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 975 (1975). The Court in Weinberger applied the Fourth Amendment,
but upheld the disclosure of information for a variety of reasons discussed infra in part III.B.
90 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 & n.23 (1977). The Court upheld the PDMP
program in Whalen, but only addressed the collection and maintenance of the PDMP data by the
state, not disclosure to law enforcement. Id. at 603-04. Justice Brennan indicated in his
concurrence that the Fourth Amendment may need to be applied in the future to limit the
program. Id. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 75-86. (2001).
92 Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989).
93 Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. at 136.
94 Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. DEA, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 963-68, 965 n.3
(D. Or. 2014).
95 See id. at 967-68.
96 See id. at 963-68; see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 75-86; Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden,
379 F.3d 531, 549-53 (9th Cir. 2004).
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required to obtain a warrant before receiving disclosures of information in
which individuals have a heightened expectation of privacy.
97
Courts have reasoned that "disclosures of private medical information
to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modem medical practice even when the
disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient."98 Requiring
such warrantless disclosures to state representatives in charge of public health
"does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy."
99
When determining whether an intrusion into private medical information is
reasonable, courts have examined whether the information was sought for a
legitimate governmental purpose, the manner in which the information was
gathered and maintained, and whether confidentiality is protected.' 00 Courts can
then balance these factors to determine whether the asserted government
interests outweigh the legitimate expectation of privacy.
01
The state's collection and disclosure of medical information is not a per
se violation of the Fourth Amendment, and this principle allows for the
existence of PDMPs in the first place. 10 2 The Supreme Court in Whalen v.
Roe10 3 dealt with the New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972,
which included a provision that functioned as a PDMP. 10 4 The Supreme Court
placed special importance on the fact that sufficient protections existed to keep
private information from being disclosed to the public. 10 5 The same principles
apply when the government collects healthcare information before dispensing
Medicare and Medicaid funds. 0 6 The Supreme Court affirmed a federal district
97 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 135-38 (N.D. Ill.
1975), affd, 423 U.S. 975 (1975).
101 Id. at 137.
102 Whalen, 429 U.S. 589-(1977). The provision in Whalen required physicians to provide
copies of prescription forms to the state health department, and the forms were required to
identify the patients receiving Schedule II drugs in an effort to prevent the diversion of these
drugs to illegal channels. Id. at 591-92. The Court held that the provision was not unreasonable
because sufficient protections existed to keep private information from being disclosed to the
public, and the requirement did not represent an intrusion on patient privacy. Id. at 600-02, 604.
The Court quoted language in a footnote indicating its belief that the government interest in the
reporting requirements outweighed any privacy interests that may have been compromised, if
any. Id. at 601 n.27 ("[T]he substantial public interest in disclosure... outweighs the harm
generally alleged." (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71-72 (1976)).
103 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
1o4 Id. at 591.
105 Id. at 600-02, 604.
106 Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 135 (N.D. I11.
1975). In Weinberger, the court addressed the constitutionality of the "Professional Standards
[Vol. 117
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court decision allowing the federal government to collect information about
patients to ensure the treatments they undergo are medically necessary and
done in an economical manner.
10 7
In Weinberger, the court held that the government interests in
controlling public expenditures related to healthcare were substantial enough to
outweigh the doctors' and patients' privacy interests, particularly because there
were adequate safeguards to ensure confidentiality.'0 8 The court also placed
special importance on the fact that "[C]ongress simply [was] imposing a
condition on the spending of public funds."'1 9 However, in the cases applying
these principles, the courts did not address the disclosure of personal healthcare
information to law enforcement." 0
The Supreme Court did address the disclosure of medical information
to law enforcement in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,"' where the Court held
that a patient who undergoes diagnostic tests has a reasonable expectation that
the results of those tests will not be disclosed to nonmedical personnel without
his or her consent. 12 In Ferguson, a public hospital in Charleston, South
Carolina, disclosed the names of pregnant women who had tested positive for
cocaine to police in an effort to use the threat of criminal prosecution to coerce
the women into getting treatment." 3 Here, the government asserted interests
Review" Legislation, which was intended to stem the rising costs of the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs. Id. at 128-29. The law required doctors to furnish information about patients and
treatments to a Professional Standards Review Organization ("PSRO") before receiving federal
funds to pay for such treatments. Id. at 128-30. The PSRO used the information to create patient
profiles to determine if the treatments were "medically necessary or could be provided for in a
more economical manner." Id. at 130, 135. The plaintiff sought to have the law declared
unconstitutional as a violation of rights protected by the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.
Id. at 131.
107 Id. at 130, 136-38, aff'd, 423 U.S. 975 (1975).
108 Id. at 130, 135-36. The law required the use of medical coding to ensure "maximum
confidentiality and objective evaluation." Id. at 130. The court in Weinberger specifically
addressed the Fourth Amendment privacy claims in its opinion, and the medical coding used
weighed heavily in the government's favor during the analysis. See id. at 135-38.
109 Id. at 138 (quoting Cal. Banker's Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 50 (1974)).
110 See id.; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 589 (1977). Justice Brennan's concurrence in
Whalen also stressed that the information was "made available only to a small number of public
health officials with a legitimate interest in the information," and "[b]road dissemination by state
officials of such information, however, would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy
rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests." Id. at 606.
' 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
12 Id. at 78.
113 Id. at 69-73, 79-81. The women were tested as part of their prenatal care, and there was a
question as to whether the women consented to the information being turned over to law
enforcement. Id. at 69, 75-76.
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beyond the need for law enforcement for its policy to disclose the positive drug
tests to law enforcement agencies.'
1 4
The Court closely scrutinized the scheme to disclose positive tests to
law enforcement in Ferguson, and did not accept the government's asserted
"special need" in "protecting the health of both mother and child."' 15
Furthermore, the Court distinguished the drug tests in Ferguson from other
statutorily mandated disclosures by healthcare providers:1
16
The fact that positive test results were turned over to the police
does not merely provide a basis for distinguishing our prior
cases applying the "special needs" balancing approach to the
determination of drug use. It also provides an affirmative
reason for enforcing the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
While state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a
duty to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct
that they inadvertently acquire in the course of routine
treatment, when they undertake to obtain such evidence from
their patientsfor the specific purpose of incriminating those
patients, they have a special obligation to make sure that the
patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights, as
standards of knowing waiver require.' 
7
Although the Court emphasized the physician's purpose for obtaining the urine
samples, the purpose only became impermissible when the hospital disclosed
the results of the test to law enforcement." 8 Prior to the formulation of the
disclosure policy, the hospital was collecting and analyzing prenatal patients'
urine if they met certain medical criteria that indicated potential cocaine use.' 19
114 Id. at 81.
115 Id. at 81-86. In coming to this conclusion the Court noted that the policy said nothing
about different courses of treatment for the mother and child and was developed in close and
constant collaboration with law enforcement. Id.
116 Doctors are often required by law to report crimes or threats to health and safety such as
suspected child abuse, self-inflicted wounds, and threats made to third parties. See Mental Health
Professionals' Duty to Protect/Warn, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGS. (Jan. 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx; see also
Noreen M. Grant, Note, Psychiatrists Have No Duty to Warn Third Parties of Patients' Threats:
Tarasoff is Kicked Out of Texas... Finally!, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L. Rev. 157 (2001); Patricia C.
Kussmann, Annotation, Liability of Doctor, Psychiatrist, or Psychologist for Failure to Take
Steps to Prevent Patient's Suicide, 81 A.L.R.5th 167 (2000); Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation,
Validity, Construction and Application of State Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to
Report Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R.4th 782 (1989).
117 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-85 (emphasis in original).
118 See id. at 85-86.
119 Schuyler Frautschi, Understanding the Public Health Policies Behind Ferguson, 27 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 587, 588-90 (2001-02).
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The Court held that because the "immediate objective" of the disclosures was
to obtain evidence for "law enforcement purposes, .. . [t]he Fourth
Amendment's general prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and
suspicionless searches" applied. 1
20
The District Court in the Oregon case, discussed supra in Part IL.C,
dealt specifically with law enforcement access to state PDMPs.121 The court
easily found that patients' "subjective expectation of privacy in their
prescription information is objectively reasonable."' 122 In coming to its
conclusion, the court in the Oregon case cited various sources of privacy
protection for health information.12 3 The court qualified the right, indicating
that access by medical personnel was allowed, but stated, "[I]t is more than
reasonable for patients to believe that law enforcement agencies will not have
unfettered access to their records."'
2 4
The court cited this legitimate expectation of privacy as grounds for
denying the DEA's argument that the "third party doctrine" 125 should apply,
distinguishing the cases in which that doctrine did apply.1 26 The court
concluded that the DEA could not use an administrative subpoena, in lieu of a
warrant, to obtain Oregon's PDMP data.1 27 Without invoking the use of a
balancing test, the court nevertheless concluded that the government's asserted
interests for using the administrative subpoena to access PDMP data did not
outweigh the patient's expectation of privacy in that data, and therefore, the use
of the administrative subpoena in this way violated the Fourth Amendment.' 
28
120 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83, 86 (emphasis in original). The Court specifically stated that
the facts in Ferguson provided not only "a basis for distinguishing our prior cases applying the
'special needs' balancing approach .... It also provides an affirmative reason for enforcing the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 84. Indicating that the balance in this case shifted in
favor of the patients, thus the government's interest in the disclosure did not outweigh the
patients' expectation of privacy. See id. at 82-86.
121 See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. DEA, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, (D. Or.
2014).
122 Id. at 966.
123 Id. at 964-65.
124 Id. at 966.
125 Id. at 966-68. The third party doctrine is discussed more fully infra in Part III.D. It is a
standing doctrine that forecloses individuals from challenging subpoenas issued for or searches
of a third-party's records to which the individual being investigated may have disclosed
incriminating information. See sources cited infra note 126.
126 Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 966-68. But see United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (applying the doctrine to bank records); United States v.
Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, 689 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying the third party doctrine to
the disclosure of utility records); United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077 (6th Cir. 1993)
(applying the doctrine to telephone and credit card statements).
127 Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 967-68.
128 See id. at 963-68.
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Thus, warrantless disclosures of medical information to the state are
not per se invalid, and these disclosures serve diverse regulatory functions such
as monitoring prescription drugs and controlling public healthcare
expenditures. However, patients still entertain a subjectively heightened, and
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their healthcare information.
Therefore, patients have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their personally
identifiable PDMP data that is protected under the Fourth Amendment. The
legitimate expectation of privacy that triggers Fourth Amendment protection is
based on several sources of privacy protection for healthcare information
discussed in the next Section, which indicate that the expectation is objectively
reasonable.
C. Other Sources of Privacy Protection for Health Information
In addition to constitutional amendments, federal and state laws have
addressed privacy issues concerning health information, including the "Privacy
Rule" that accompanied the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act, 129 recognized doctor-patient privilege, 130 the various professional oaths
taken by doctors, and privacy protections incorporated into the various state
PDMP laws.13 1 These laws, and the professional oaths, reflect a general concern
by citizens and healthcare providers regarding the privacy of their medical
information. Through these measures, lawmakers and doctors have endeavored
to ensure patients are honest and candid, and that they do not forego medical
treatment due to privacy concerns. 132
The "Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information," known as the HIPAA Privacy Rule, protects individually
identifiable health information. 133 The rule was created to "assure that
individuals' health information is properly protected while allowing the flow of
health information needed to provide and promote high quality health
care.. .. ,134 The rule prohibits disclosure of any health information that
identifies the individual or "for which there is a reasonable basis to believe can
129 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2012); Kendra Gray, Note, The Privacy Rule: Are We Being
Deceived?, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 89 (2008).
130 Maintaining Privacy of Health Information, in 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: HEALTH
CARE: HEALTH CARE FACILITIES (2013), available at 0100 SURVEYS 7 (Westlaw).
131 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 37-38.
132 See Marie C. Pollio, Note, The Inadequacy of HIPPA's Privacy Rule: The Plain Language
Notice of Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 579
(2004), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ecm-pro_- 064663.pdf.
133 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1, 3-4
(2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/
privacysummary.pdf.
134 Id. at 1.
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be used to identify the individual.' 35 The rule does allow for disclosure of the
information to law enforcement in six circumstances, including, "as required by
law," which covers disclosures in response to court orders, warrants, and
subpoenas. 
36
While not all jurisdictions recognize a doctor-patient privilege, and no
such privilege existed at common law, most states have adopted doctor-patient
privilege by statute. 3 7 The privilege is held by the patient but may be invoked
by a physician on behalf of a patient. 138 The privilege is not destroyed by the
presence of medical personnel reasonably necessary to diagnose or treat the
patient, close family or friends, or others whose presence the patient was unable
to prevent. 139 The doctor-patient privilege protects communications as well as
observations intended by the patient to be confidential and pursuant to
diagnosis or treatment.
40
States also took patient privacy into account when creating their
PDMPs, which is demonstrated by the many states that incorporated privacy
protections into their PDMP laws. These measures include: exempting the data
from public records laws; punishing the wrongful receipt, disclosure, or use of
the information; and limiting who has access to the information. 41 Public
records laws, such as the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), typically
guarantee the public access to records produced through the normal business of
government. 142 The laws often include exemptions for certain kinds of records,
which could include PDMP data,"4' but some states have chosen to include
135 Id. at 3-4.
136 Id. at 7. The six circumstances are as follows:
(1) as required by law (including court orders, court-ordered warrants,
subpoenas) and administrative requests; (2) to identify or locate a suspect,
fugitive, material witness, or missing person; (3) in response to a law
enforcement official's request for information about a victim or suspected
victim of a crime; (4) to alert law enforcement of a person's death, if the
covered entity suspects that criminal activity caused the death; (5) when a
covered entity believes that protected health information is evidence of a
crime that occurred on its premises; and (6) by a covered health care provider
in a medical emergency not occurring on its premises, when necessary to
inform law enforcement about the commission and nature of a crime, the
location of the crime or crime victims, and the perpetrator of the crime.
Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §164.512(f) (2013)).





141 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 36-38.
142 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 119.011(12) (2013); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-
2(4) (2013).
143 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9).
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specific exemptions in their PDMP legislation. 144 In addition, some states make
it a crime or impose civil fines when unauthorized users access PDMP
information or when authorized or unauthorized users wrongfully use or
disclose the information. 145 Finally, all states restrict access to PDMP data by
designating and licensing narrow classes of authorized users. 146 The National
Alliance for Model State Drug Laws 147 recommends these measures to help
ensure confidentiality in state PDMPs.1
48
Finally, not all sources of privacy protection for healthcare information
are derived from the law. The professional oaths taken by healthcare providers,
often variations of the Hippocratic Oath, specifically address patient privacy:
"What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the
treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread
abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken
about.', 14 9 Again, this confidentiality aspect of the oaths seeks to ensure patients
are candid and honest with their healthcare providers and to protect those
patients in vulnerable positions.'
50
All of these laws reflect society's general acceptance of the idea that
medical information merits protection under the law. But other laws reflect
society's acceptance of the notion that, in some cases, law enforcement must be
empowered to investigate crimes without a strict application of the Fourth
Amendment. Typically, under the Fourth Amendment and subject to the
exceptions described in Part III.A, law enforcement must obtain a warrant
before conducting a search or seizure. However, Congress provided the
Attorney General with a broad subpoena power to investigate violations of the
Controlled Substances Act, which may act in the stead of a warrant in some
circumstances.
D. The Administrative Subpoena
The administrative subpoena power at issue in the Oregon PDMP case,
discussed supra,5' is an atypically broad grant of power to an agency.
152
144 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 15.
"' Id. at 37.
146 Id. at 14.
147 The National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws was formed by Congress in 1993 as the
President's Commission on Model State Drug Laws to create a model code of laws to help states
deal with alcohol and drug abuse. History, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR MODEL ST. DRUG LAWS,
http://www.namsdl.org/history.cftn (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
148 NAMSDL, supra note 2 1, at 15.
149 See Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html.
150 Id.
151 See supra Part II.C.
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However, courts have held that this power, clearly granted by Congress to a
law enforcement official, is not invalid simply because it departs from the
typical probable cause requirement in criminal investigations. 153 In United
States v. Hossbach,154 a Pennsylvania district court was reluctant to overturn
the law permitting administrative subpoenas under the Controlled Substances
Act.155 The court felt it was within the legislature's power to pass the law,
despite strong historical precedent that indicated such subpoenas should not be
valid in criminal investigations. 56 Thus, the administrative subpoena power
granted by 21 U.S.C. § 876, is not a per se violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 1
57
Still, the courts have not completely abandoned the Fourth Amendment
analysis when determining the validity of an administrative subpoena. For
example, the Ninth Circuit held that administrative subpoenas can be
constitutionally valid, analogizing them to Grand Jury subpoenas that may be
issued only on suspicion that a crime has been committed or for assurance that
the crime has not been committed. 158 However, this circuit has only upheld
subpoenas in situations addressing records in which an individual has no
legitimate expectation of privacy, such as business records.' 59
The Sixth Circuit has held similarly, applying the "third party doctrine"
to find that individuals do not have standing to dispute an administrative
subpoena issued to a third-party on Fourth Amendment grounds where that
individual has no "actual and justifiable privacy interest" in the records
152 See United States v. Hossbach, 518 F. Supp. 759, 767 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
153 Id.
154 Id.
151 Id. at 766-67.
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950)). In Golden Valley, the DEA
subpoenaed information from an energy cooperative about energy consumption by three of its
customers as part of a criminal investigation for suspected violations of the Controlled
Substances Act. Id. at 1111. The agents suspected the customers' residences were being used to
grow marijuana under artificial lights. Id. at 1114 ("[Ellectricity consumption can indicate
whether a person is growing marijuana because 'grow lamps necessitat[e] a large amount of
electricity."'). The court in Golden Valley pointed out that the information sought in that case
consisted of business records in which the customers, the subjects of the investigation, had no
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 1116-17.
159 Id. at 1116. By basing its Fourth Amendment ruling on the lack of a legitimate expectation
of privacy, the court left the door open for lower courts in the Ninth Circuit to invalidate
subpoenas that seek information in which the subject individuals may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy. Id. ("Depending on the circumstances or the type of information, a
company's guarantee to its customers that it will safeguard the privacy of their records might
suffice to justify resisting an administrative subpoena.").
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obtained. 160  Thus, courts have entertained challenges to administrative
subpoenas on Fourth Amendment grounds, even if they usually have stopped
short of invalidating them. In contrast, a district court in the Ninth Circuit
specifically refused to allow the DEA to use an administrative subpoena to
access PDMP data because of the legitimate expectation of privacy associated
with the data.1
6 1
The Sixth Circuit case where the court applied the third-party doctrine,
United States v. Phibbs, 62 also discussed the administrative subpoena power,
warrants, and the judicial process required for the issuance or enforcement of
either. 163 The administrative sub oena does not completely abandon judicial
process in its administration. However, the standard used to enforce
administrative subpoenas duces tecuml 65 is not as strict as those used to issue a
warrant. 166 If it is a subpoena duces tecum, "the subpoenaed party [must be able
to] obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand before suffering
penalties for refusing to comply.' 16 But, if an on-premises search is required to
execute the subpoena, and the sole purpose of the subpoena is to gather
evidence for a criminal investigation, a warrant is required before the subpoena
160 United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119 (1994). In Phibbs, one of the
codefendants, Victor Rojas, challenged the validity of a subpoena used by the DEA to obtain his
telephone records and credit card statements. Id. at 1076-78. The Sixth Circuit invoked the
"third-party" doctrine applied in Miller, where the defendant had "no protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in his bank records. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436-40 (1976)
(citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971)) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities[.]"). The third-party doctrine applies "even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed." Id. Thus, the court in Phibbs held that the defendant did not
have standing to dispute an administrative subpoena issued to a third party on Fourth
Amendment grounds, because the defendant had no "actual and justifiable privacy interest" in the
records obtained. Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1077-78.
161 Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. DEA, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 961 (D. Or.
2014).
162 Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1053.
163 Id. (The analysis of the standards required for administrative subpoenas in Phibbs is only
dicta; however, because the court disposed of these issues on standing grounds rather than the
merits of the petitioner's constitutional claims.).
'64 Id. at 1077.
165 A subpoena duces tecum is "a subpoena ordering the witness to appear in court and to
bring specified documents, records, or things." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1563 (9th ed. 2009).
166 See Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1077 (The subpoena has to be "sufficiently limited in scope,
relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance [would] not be unreasonable."
(quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967))).
167 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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can be served.1 68 This clearly demonstrates that administrative subpoenas duces
tecum do not require a showing of probable cause, as warrants do.
A search warrant must meet similar standards of reasonableness
relating to its scope, purpose, and specificity, but law enforcement must also
show probable cause: "[a] reasonable ground.. . that a person has committed
or is committing a crime, or that a place contains specific items connected with
a crime."'169 There must be "individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." 17' This
condition requires the agent or officer to attest to facts that demonstrate why the
search should be permitted.1 71 The reasonableness standard for administrative
subpoenas does not require this showing of why the search should be permitted,
only that the search itself and what will be searched or disclosed is
reasonable. 172
To summarize, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
warrantless intrusions into specific zones of privacy, created by the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment does not foreclose
warrantless disclosures of medical information when the government can assert
needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement, but the normal need for
law enforcement will not suffice, on its own, to justify warrantless disclosures.
In addition, the government interest must outweigh the expectation of privacy.
Privacy protections for healthcare information exist outside of Fourth
Amendment precedent in the form of statutes and the Hippocratic Oath which
demonstrates that an expectation of privacy in this information is objectively
reasonable. Finally, the administrative subpoena power is a valid grant of
congressional power to the executive that allows some warrantless disclosures
of information to law enforcement, but this power is not enough to overcome a
legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The next Part applies the various laws discussed in this Part to
determine if individuals have a legitimate, and possibly heightened, expectation
of privacy in their PDMP data to justify Fourth Amendment protection.
Through this application, this Note shows that patients' have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in their personally identifiable PDMP data, and the
Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement obtain a warrant before
accessing personally identifiable PDMP data.
168 Id.
169 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009).
170 Chandlerv. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 312 (1997).
171 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
172 See Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1077.
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Iv. A PATIENT'S LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN PDMP DATA
JUSTIFIES A WARRANT REQUIREMENT
This Part argues that law enforcement must obtain a warrant before
accessing personally identifiable PDMP data. The purposes of state PDMPs are
somewhat varied. 173 Ultimately, the programs are intended to help states
regulate controlled substances and prevent abuse of these substances by
providing prescribers, dispensers, and law enforcement with the information
necessary to identify individuals that may be diverting prescription drugs from
legitimate channels to sell or use illicitly. 74 However, states must balance the
various means used to achieve these various purposes against the patients'
expectations of privacy. When law enforcement agents seek access to PDMP
data for the purpose of enforcing drug laws, states must require them to obtain
a warrant to ensure that innocent individuals do not have their private medical
information needlessly disclosed and disseminated. Furthermore, states should
make sure that, even with a valid warrant or valid warrantless access (by a
doctor, nurse, or pharmacist), the subsequent wrongful dissemination and
disclosure of PDMP data is punishable by criminal and/or civil penalties, and
that PDMP data is specifically exempted from public records laws.
In this Part, Section A discusses why patients have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in their prescription information, Section B discusses
why law enforcement must obtain a warrant before accessing this information,
and Section C discusses why states should include additional privacy
protections in their PDMPs beyond the warrant requirement for law
enforcement.
A. Patients Have a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Their PDMP
Data
Prescription information, like other healthcare information, is
inherently personal.175 Patients often do not discuss these issues publicly, and in
many cases, the information may be embarrassing or potentially damaging to
one's reputation.1 76 The information is typically only exchanged within
relationships that society has begun to recognize as privileged: those
relationships between doctors and patients. 177 The following subsections will
explain why patients have a subjective expectation of privacy in their
prescription information, and why this expectation is objectively reasonable.
173 See NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 11; see also supra note 25.
174 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 11; see also supra note 25.
175 Complaint in Intervention, supra note 61.
176 Id. at 19.
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The analysis will also argue why extra-constitutional sources of privacy
protection for health information have bolstered these arguments. 178
1. Patients Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in Their PDMP
Data
The first level of analysis must determine whether the individual
raising Fourth Amendment privacy issues has a subjective expectation of
privacy in the information that will be the subject of the search.17 9 When
applied to a physical search, courts have held that individuals have a subjective
expectation of privacy in their homes.18 0 With regard to medical information,
courts have usually found that a subjective expectation of privacy exists.1
81
A subjective expectation is easy to assert so long as the individual
"took normal precautions to maintain his privacy."'' 82 Such precautions-
which in the case of healthcare information would likely mean not discussing
your personal health information publicly or not disclosing it to individuals
beyond healthcare providers, family, and very close friends-represent a
subjective expectation by the patient that their health information will remain
private.
Therefore, it is clear that courts recognize that patients often, if not
always, maintain some subjective expectation of privacy in their medical
information. The subjective expectation of privacy is not controlling, however,
and its presence or absence will not determine whether the Fourth Amendment
applies. Its presence or absence only determines whether the first prong of the
test is satisfied. The subjective expectation must also be objectively
reasonable.1
83
2. Society Is Prepared To Recognize this Expectation as Objectively
Reasonable
Once the subjective expectation of privacy is asserted, the court must
determine whether this expectation is objectively reasonable. An expectation of
privacy must be "reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances."
1 84
178 See supra Part III.C.
179 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
180 See id.
181 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (patients undergoing diagnostic
tests in a hospital enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy, such that the results of such tests
will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without consent).
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Several factors may be considered when determining whether an expectation of
privacy is reasonable, including "the precautions a person takes to maintain his
privacy, the way he uses a location, the history of the Fourth Amendment, the
property interests involved, and society's recognition of customary
behavior."'1 85 This analysis is most often applied to physical searches but could
also be applied to the disclosure of information.' 
86
With regard to the disclosure of information, the Supreme Court "has
held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities.' 87 This "third party" doctrine applies "even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the party will not be betrayed."' 188 This reasoning stands
somewhat at odds with Ferguson, where urine was turned over by patients' to
third-party doctors as part of prenatal treatment but the subsequent urinalysis
results could not be used as evidence for criminal prosecution without the
patients' consent or a warrant. 189 But the distinction becomes clear if one
examines the cases in which this "third-party" exception was applied, because
those cases dealt with information not typically associated with privacy rights,
such as bank records. 190
Medical information is clearly distinguishable from bank records, as
are the government interests in obtaining either. Bank records differ from
PDMP data because the health information PDMP data contains is "'more
185 United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152-53
n.12), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 (1981).
186 To the extent the factors presented in Smith can be applied to a disclosure of information,
the fact that no physical search was involved does not matter because "[e]xpectations of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in
real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
Therefore, it is a logical conclusion that factors a court uses to determine whether a legitimate
expectation of privacy exists within the context of a physical invasion of person or property
could be used to evaluate the legitimacy of an expectation outside the context of a physical
invasion of person or property, excluding factors specifically relating to a physical location. For
example, a person who does not openly discuss his medical conditions is taking precautions to
"maintain his privacy," and as discussed infra in Part IV.A.2, society recognizes this "behavior"
as reasonable if not "customary." Smith, 621 F.2d at 487; see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-85.
187 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 447-51 (1963) (stating that expressing a thought or message to a third party is a
risk the speaker takes that the information may be discoverable)).
188 Id.
189 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-85.
190 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 440-44.
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inherently personal or private than [the information in] bank records,' and are
entitled to and treated with a heightened expectation of privacy."'
' 91
Furthermore, the relationship between doctor and patient is much
different than the relationship between the banker and the depositor. 19' If a
patient cannot opt out of having their prescription data collected for a PDMP
(mandatory participation is a commonly recommended practice),' 93 then the
only way to avoid submission of prescription information to ... PDMP[s] is to
forgo medical treatment .... ,19 A bank transaction is entirely voluntary.
Individuals can hoard their money under their mattresses without jeopardizing
their life or happiness, but medical treatment, because it is often necessary for
life or happiness, forces patients to seek out doctors. Simply put, "patients and
doctors are not voluntarily conveying information to the PDMP."1
95
Strong policy considerations back up the assertion that medical
information disclosed and discussed between a doctor and a patient should not
be subject to unconsented, warrantless disclosures. 96 As discussed in the next
sub-section, several sources of privacy protection beyond the Fourth
Amendment illustrate these policy considerations and bolster the argument that
patients have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their PDMP
data.
3. Privacy Expectations for Health Information, Including PDMP
Data, Have Sources Beyond the Fourth Amendment
Legitimate expectations of privacy must be derived from a source other
than the Fourth Amendment. 97 Property rights were the earliest sources used to
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.'
98
In the case of health information, there are many sources for an expectation of
privacy beyond the Constitution. These sources include recognized doctor-
patient privileges, the Privacy Rule accompanying the Health Insurance
191 Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. DEA, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (D. Or.
2014) (quoting United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, 689 F.3d 1116, 1116 (9th Cir.
2012)).
192 See id.
193 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 12, 14.
194 Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 967 ("That is not a
meaningful choice.").
195 See id.
196 See supra Part III.C (regarding ensuring patients are honest and candid with healthcare
providers).
197 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
198 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 809 (2004).
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Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), the Hippocratic Oath taken by
doctors, and privacy protections accompanying the state PDMPs.1 99
Although doctor-patient privileges did not exist at common law, they
have developed over time in many states and operate like any other evidentiary
privilege, barring individuals from testifying about those privileged matters.2 °°
The privilege is justified by the need to preserve trust in the doctor-patient
relationship. 20 1 This trust is important because it encourages patient candor,
which is necessary for the proper diagnosis and treatment of disease or
injury. 202 While HIPAA came about for many reasons, including improving
communication of health information between providers and insurance entities,
it also included a "privacy rule" to help protect this information from extensive
disclosure and dissemination.20 3 Again, confidentiality is a central concern
regarding healthcare information.
This confidentiality and the resulting trust are, in fact, central to the
practice of medicine, as evidenced by the various professional oaths taken by
physicians.20 4 The fact that many states have included additional privacy
protections in their PDMPs, such as imposing criminal or civil punishments for
wrongful disclosure of PDMP data, only further indicates a strong desire to
keep healthcare information private, to promote patient candor.205
These various protections for patient privacy clearly indicate that this is
an expectation of privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.20 6
Patients are entitled to rely on Fourth Amendment holdings and laws such as
HIPAA, and these laws provide objective support for the notion that society
recognizes their subjective expectation as reasonable. Protecting the privacy of
patients serves important policy functions, such as encouraging candor with
healthcare providers and protecting individuals from embarrassment or
judgment based on their health or medical choices. While some state interests
199 See supra Part III.C.
200 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 137, § 5:42.
201 See Anne D. Lampkin, Should Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Be Recognized?, 18 AM.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 721 (1995).
202 See id.
203 See Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the Privacy Gap
Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 535 (2001).
204 See Tyson, supra note 149. While the Tyson article points out that some have called the
purpose and effectiveness of oaths in modem medicine into question, their prevalence and
consistent inclusion of clauses requiring confidentiality demonstrates the importance privacy still
holds in modem medicine. See Jessica De Bord et al., Confidentiality, UNIV. OF WASH. SCH. OF
MED. (Mar. 6, 2014), https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/confiden.html.
205 See NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 15, 37.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/11
MINDING YOUR MEDS
may warrant an intrusion into this privacy, the interest in law enforcement is
not enough to permit such intrusions without a warrant.
B. Law Enforcement Must Show Probable Cause and Obtain a Warrant
Before Accessing PDMP Data
As discussed above,20 7 this Note shows that individuals have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their medical information, but this does not
end the Fourth Amendment analysis. Once a zone of privacy is implicated, the
court must balance the specific intrusion and the government interests served
by intruding on the zone against the specific privacy interest implicated.20 8 This
Note addresses only disclosures of PDMP data to law enforcement serving
government interests relating to the need for law enforcement.
1. The State's Interest in Law Enforcement Does Not Outweigh a
Patient's Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Their PDMP Data
The issue addressed in this Section is somewhat novel. The only case
law that has been established relating specifically to law enforcement access to
PDMP data is a district court case in Oregon,20 9 but existing Supreme Court
precedent does suggest that PDMP data should not be subject to warrantless
and unconsented access by law enforcement. 21 0 The case that most clearly
supports this assertion is Ferguson, because it deals with warrantless law
enforcement access to private health information.
In Ferguson, patients provided urine samples as part of their prenatal
treatment, and samples that tested positive for cocaine were provided to law
enforcement. 21' The women in Ferguson were then threatened with arrest
unless they entered drug treatment.21 2 In the case of PDMP data, the patients'
prescription information is collected as part of their treatment for any number
of conditions, and the data is kept by the state.213 Although doctors may not be
affirmatively providing PDMP information to law enforcement, as in Ferguson,
allowing law enforcement to obtain the information without a warrant has the
same effect: the warrantless, unconsented disclosure of private health
207 See supra Part IV.A.2.
208 Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
209 See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
210 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al., 476 U.S. 747, 774-76 (1986).
211 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-76.
212 Id. at 70-74.
213 See NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 6.
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information purely for law enforcement purposes.' 14 Furthermore, the
government's interest in such disclosures does not outweigh the privacy
interests of the patients.215
It is more difficult for the government to assert interests beyond the
normal need for law enforcement in a case involving law enforcement access to
PDMP data, than it was to assert additional interests in Ferguson. First, in
Ferguson, law enforcement had a unique coercive ability that they used in an
attempt to protect the unborn children by getting their mothers off of drugs, and
the healthcare providers were not succeeding in getting the women to stop
216using drugs on their own. Second, the drugs in Ferguson were illegal drugs
without legitimate medical uses-at least in the context that the women were
using them-but doctors prescribe the drugs disclosed in PDMP data for
legitimate medical uses. 217 Third, the doctors in Ferguson only turned over
positive tests for an illegal drug.218 With PDMP data, there is a much greater
potential that innocent patients' data will be disclosed.2 19 Finally, any interests
in limiting the diversion and abuse of prescription drugs can be achieved by the
physicians and pharmacists without law enforcement. A doctor can use the data
to identify and deny drugs to a doctor-shopping patient, as may a pharmacist.
220
The data could also be used to ensure patients are not receiving drugs in excess
221
of reasonable therapeutic ranges without law enforcement accessing the data.
Certainly, the question arises as to whether a doctor should be
obligated, or even allowed to disclose information about a patient's drug habits
to law enforcement when he believes a patient is abusing drugs. Doctor-patient
privilege would suggest a doctor should never be allowed to disclose this type
of information to law enforcement,222 and the ruling in Ferguson also seems to
lead to the conclusion that disclosing such evidence of drug abuse to law
enforcement should be forbidden without patient consent or a warrant.223
Conversely, doctors are often obligated to report evidence of issues such as
domestic abuse, self-inflicted harm, or threats to third parties, but these
obligations typically come into play to protect individuals from threats of
214 See Kam, supra note 51.
215 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-86.
216 Id. at 70-71.
217 See id. at 70.
218 Id. at 73.
219 See Kam, supra note 51.
220 See Nick Budnick, Hundreds of High-Prescribers Don 't Check Oregon 's Pharmacy-
Monitoring Program, OREGONLIVE (Dec. 18, 2012, 9:01 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/
health/index.ssf/2012/12/hundreds-ofjhigh-prescribersd.html.
221 See Meier, Painkiller Crackdown, supra note 14.
222 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 137.
223 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-86.
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imminent harm.224 Perhaps a doctor may have to alert authorities if he believes
an overdose by one of his or her patients is imminent, but PDMPs contain
information about patients that are not facing imminent harm. Thus, allowing
law enforcement unwarranted access to PDMPs is not congruent with the other
disclosure requirements.
While doctors' hands should not be tied when they suspect a patient is
engaging in unlawful drug-seeking behavior or drug abuse, reporting such
behavior to law enforcement would hopefully be a last resort. The need to
report is lessened simply because the PDMP can allow pharmacists and
prescribers to identify doctor-shoppers and deny them medication. 225 Ideally,
responsible physicians would try to get these patients to seek treatment, or
supervise them through some form of a cessation program.226 Thus, any law
that mandates disclosure of suspected drug abuse to law enforcement should
not be necessary and would prevent doctors from pursuing other measures
before tipping off law enforcement. The alternative method of using physicians
and pharmacists to prevent drug abuse further illustrates law enforcement's
limited interest in accessing PDMP data without a warrant.
Therefore, the only interest a law enforcement agency can assert when
seeking access to PDMP data without a warrant is the need for law
enforcement, and this need is not enough to overcome the patients' legitimate
expectation of privacy in their health information protected by the Fourth
Amendment.227  Furthermore, as discussed in the next Section, the
administrative subpoena cannot displace a warrant with regard to this
information.
2. Administrative Subpoenas Cannot Be Used To Obtain PDMP Data
The DEA has attempted to use the Attorney General's administrative
subpoena power under 21 U.S.C. § 876 to access PDMP information without
obtaining a warrant, despite state laws requiring warrants for law enforcement
agents to access the information. 8 While the administrative subpoena does not
totally abandon judicial process, as the agency issuing the subpoena must seek
a court order to have the subpoena enforced, the standard for such a ruling is
less stringent than probable cause.22 9 Determining whether the subpoena is
224 See supra note 116.
225 See Budnick, supra note 221.
226 See Michael C. Barnes, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Lawful Access and Abuse Deterrence, Legal
Policy Strategies To Address an Evolving Epidemic (Feb. 13, 2014), available at
http://claad.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CLAAD-WVU- 140211 -Compatibility-Mode.pdf.
227 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-83.
228 Complaint in Intervention, supra note 61, at 10.
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reasonable, as is required for enforcement, has nothing to do with the issue of
why the information was subpoenaed, only what the information subpoenaed
was and whether the subpoena was narrow in scope, relevant in purpose, and
specific.230
While the relevance requirement may provide some vague concept of
why the subpoena should be enforced, it deals mostly with why the agent wants
the information to further this specific investigation, not why they deserve to
access the information. In essence, to get a judge to enforce an administrative
subpoena, it is enough for an agent to say, hypothetically, "We need the
suspect's utility records because we are investigating him for growing
marijuana, the subpoenaed party has easy access to those records and the
number of records requested is not unreasonably large."23' On the other hand,
to get a warrant the agent must say, "We need the suspect's utility records
because we are investigating him for growing marijuana, the subpoenaed party
has easy access to those records, the number of records requested is not
unreasonably large, and we know the suspect purchased several high-powered
lights normally used for growing marijuana." 232 The additional factual assertion
about the lights in the second statement is the "full probable cause showing"
233necessary for the warrant.
The Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement is designed to
prevent arbitrary or groundless government searches for the purpose of
gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution.234 If the government can conduct
such searches without this showing, it opens the door for arbitrary and
groundless searches, and gives the government the power to conduct searches
for improper or nefarious reasons with little or no accountability. Requiring an
agent to attest to facts necessary to establish probable cause allows for
independent judicial analysis of those facts and provides an important check on
the executive branch. The executive branch already has enormous investigative
power, and if agents of the executive branch are allowed to sidestep the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement simply because the evidence they
want is relevant to an active investigation, "active investigations" may be
broadly defined or "investigations" may be initiated simply to use such
subpoenas in place of a warrant. Furthermore, when an agent attests to the facts
230 Id.
231 Cf United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that an administrator's investigative function is similar to a grand jury's).
232 Cf Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1077 (holding that valid search warrants are needed if consent is
not forthcoming).
233 Id. ("If, as in the instant case, the subpoena is to be based on 21 U.S.C. § 876, 'and the
purpose behind the search [is] ... a quest for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution,' a
full probable cause showing is mandatory." (citations omitted)).
234 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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necessary for probable cause in a sworn affidavit, if those facts turn out to be
fabricated or mistakenly untrue, that agent faces accountability.
235
While the probable cause requirement does not always apply in the
context of administrative searches,236 patients are not under the administrative
authority of the DEA. Patients are not regulated by the DEA, and the DEA
would not be able to pursue civil punishments, such as revocation of a
controlled substances license, against a patient. The DEA's only purpose for
obtaining the information about patients is to enforce criminal laws against
those patients, and in that context probable cause is required.237 The crux of this
principle is that the government interest in executing searches for the purpose
of administrative regulation outweighs the lessened privacy interests of the
party that is the subject of the regulation. 8
Furthermore, the administrative subpoena is traditionally limited to
information in which the individual to be prosecuted has no legitimate
expectation of privacy, such as phone, utility, and bank records. 239 These
records are considered business records "readily accessible to employees in the
normal course of business[,],,240 unlike information about prescriptions which,
are typically only accessible by certain employees as part of or during the
provision of medical services due to HIPAA and PDMP laws.24' In the case of
PDMP data, the patient can assert privacy interests in the information, and thus
the Fourth Amendment forecloses the use of an administrative subpoena to
gather this information.
Finally, the government cannot assert any "exigent circumstances," or
any other exception to the warrant requirement, that would excuse the lack of a
warrant. PDMP data is not transient: it will not disappear in the time it takes
law enforcement to get a warrant. There are no circumstances where law
235 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S.
118, 127-29 (1997).
236 See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981) ("[U]nlike searches of private homes,
which generally must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of
commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment.").
237 See Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1077 ("If, as in the instant case, the subpoena is to be based upon
21 U.S.C. § 876, 'and the purpose behind the search [is]... a quest for evidence to be used in a
criminal prosecution,' a full probable cause showing is required." (quoting United States v.
Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 165 (D. Md. 1980))).
238 United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 165 (D. Md. 1980) ("A lower standard of
probable cause is constitutionally permissible in the administrative inspection context because
the intrusion into an individual's privacy is less than that in the criminal context, and is
outweighed by the public's interest in the regulatory program.").
239 Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1077; see also United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, 689 F.3d
1108 (9th Cir. 2012).
240 Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1078.
241 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102, 160.516 (2006); NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 26.
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enforcement would need immediate access to prevent the threat of imminent
harm, where a doctor or pharmacist could not as easily prevent that harm.
Because law enforcement must obtain a warrant before accessing PDMP data,
PDMPs that do not comply with this requirement must be declared
unconstitutional.
3. State PDMPs That Allow Law Enforcement To Access the Data
Without a Warrant Are Unconstitutional
As described supra,242 state PDMPs vary in terms of the level of access
they give law enforcement.243 While some states, such as Oregon, require law
enforcement to obtain a warrant,244 others allow law enforcement to access the
data at will,245 and others house their PDMPs within law enforcement
agencies. 246 This type of unfettered access to PDMP data by law enforcement
violates patients' legitimate expectation of privacy in their health information.
Again, these law enforcement entities cannot assert any interest in obtaining the
information beyond the normal need for law enforcement, and this need alone
does not outweigh a legitimate privacy interest.
If the above principles are to apply to PDMPs at all, they must apply to
all PDMPs. Constitutionally protected privacy rights do not end at state
borders, and allowing some states to disclose this private information to law
enforcement without consent or a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment.
Therefore, any state PDMP that allows law enforcement to access PDMP data
without specific consent or a warrant are unconstitutional and must be brought
into compliance with these principles.
In summary, individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their health information, law enforcement must get a warrant before accessing
PDMP data, and an administrative subpoena will not suffice. Because the
Constitution applies to all the states, this principle applies regardless of what
state law says, and law enforcement must get a warrant before accessing PDMP
data, even where state law allows warrantless access. The next Section
recommends that states employ additional privacy protections for PDMP data
beyond the warrant requirement for law enforcement.
C. States Should Include Privacy Protection Within Their PDMPs
In addition to requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before
accessing PDMP data, states should be encouraged to include additional
242 See supra Part II.A.
243 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 29.
244 Id.
245 See id.
246 Id. at 8.
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privacy protections in their PDMPs. PDMP data is sometimes kept in electronic
databases that could be vulnerable to cyber criminals.247 There is also the
potential that unauthorized employees in doctors' offices, hospitals, and
pharmacies could gain access to the information, and even authorized users
may disclose or disseminate the information improperly.248 HIPAA laws do
impose civil and criminal penalties on individuals that disclose personally
identifiable health information, 249 and in many ways, this may be a sufficient
means of punishing individuals that improperly disclose PDMP data. Still,
some states have included additional penalties within their PDMP laws that
specifically apply to PDMP data.250
The advantages of including penalties within PDMP laws, beyond
HIPAA laws, should not be understated. The federal government, through a
relatively complex regulatory scheme, enforces HIPAA, a federal law.251 The
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") is
in charge of ensuring that covered entities comply with HIPAA laws, and the
OCR is also in charge of imposing civil penalties for noncompliance. 5 2
Criminal prosecutions under the HIPAA privacy rule are handled by the
Department of Justice.253 These federal agencies are already spread very thin,
and federal court dockets have little room for additional cases. Including
penalties in state PDMPs empowers state governments to deal with improper
use and disclosure of PDMP data. State courts could handle prosecutions, and
civil or criminal fines could go back to the states to help fund their PDMPs.
Therefore, states can benefit financially, and violations can be dealt with in a
more efficient manner, if they include penalties within their PDMP laws.
Additionally, states should explicitly exempt PDMP data from public records
laws such as the Freedom of Information Act.
254
It seems counter-intuitive that PDMP data would be subject to Freedom
of Information Act ("FOIA") requests by the general public, but because the
data is maintained by the state, and because PDMPs use public funds to
operate, there is at least a cognizable argument that the data is a public
record.255 Some states have addressed this by specifically exempting PDMP
247 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 6.
248 See Kam, supra note 51.
249 42 C.F.R. § 3.418 (2012).
250 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 15.
251 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.).
252 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 133, at 3-4.
253 Id. at 18.
254 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 15.
255 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2) (2012).
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data from public records requests.256 However, these additional protections may
not be necessary due to exemptions already contained in public records laws.
2 57
But a specific statutory exemption within the PDMP legislation ensures that the
information is not subject to public records requests, and when individual
privacy rights are implicated states should be encouraged to use any means
necessary to protect these rights.
These additional privacy protections, while not entirely necessary,
could help quell fears that PDMPs have created relating to patient privacy.258
Patients must be honest and candid with healthcare providers, and knowing that
their private health information is protected by all possible means can help
encourage candor. Furthermore, with confidence in the government at an all-
time low, 259 anything that can be done to lend credibility to and increase the
public's confidence in the system should be pursued. Again, states should be
encouraged to use all available means to protect patient privacy, particularly
when they undertake efforts to collect and maintain private health information.
The following Part proposes a solution to the issues relating to law enforcement
access to PDMP data that effectively balances the need for law enforcement
with patients' privacy interests.
v. BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF EVERYONE: How To GIVE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO PDMP DATA WITHOUT VIOLATING PATIENT
PRIVACY
Because patients' legitimate expectation of privacy means law
enforcement must get a warrant before accessing PDMP data, alternative means
may be necessary for law enforcement to effectively combat sophisticated drug
diversion operations. 260 The need for enforcing drug laws is still an important
governmental interest, particularly in light of the rise in prescription drug abuse
and overdose deaths.261 By simply giving law enforcement unfettered access to
de-identified PDMP information about Schedule II drugs (or to specific
commonly-abused drugs), states can balance everyone's interests, giving law
enforcement an effective tool for investigating crimes and protecting the
privacy of patients.
The primary issue with law enforcement access to PDMP data is that
the data contains personally identifiable health information, including patients'
256 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 15.
257 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9).
258 See Kam, supra note 51.
259 Mollie Reilly, Congress Approval Rating Drops to Dismal 5 Percent in Poll, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/09/congress-approval-rating-n-
4069899.html.
260 See Dutko, supra note 48, at 758-60; see also Kam, supra note 51.
261 See supra Part I.
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names, contact information and prescription histories.262 Patients are entitled to
assert privacy interests in this type of information; therefore, it should not be
the subject of warrantless or unconsented search and disclosure.263 However,
there is no reason an agency like the DEA, which has administrative authority
over prescribers and dispensers, could not obtain information about doctors
and pharmacists so long as the information does not contain personally
identifiable health information about patients.
In this context, the administrative subpoena is appropriate, even for the
purpose of criminal prosecution, because of the authority administrative
agencies have over doctors and pharmacists. While this type of information
may lead to criminal charges, doctors and pharmacists do not have the same
privacy interest in the prescriptions they write and fill as patients have in the
prescriptions they take.264 Furthermore, an administrative subpoena is not
invalid simply because it seeks information as part of a criminal
investigation.265 This information could be used to identify doctors that may be
complicit in drug diversion rings, 266 or doctors that are irresponsibly
prescribing drugs.267
Law enforcement could also be given access to PDMP data without a
warrant as long as the names of patients and their prescription histories are
separated in a way that prevents the names and health information from being
correlated. For example, law enforcement could be given access to the names
of patients receiving prescriptions, but not the specific prescriptions they
received. Also, law enforcement could access lists of the Schedule II
prescriptions and their quantities, but not the names of the patients receiving
the drugs.268 In this way, law enforcement could examine PDMP data for
suspicious activity, such as excessive quantities of drugs going to a single
patient or fake names and stolen identities among the names of patients
receiving prescription drugs. Furthermore, by restricting this unfettered access
to info relating to Schedule I drugs or even just a specific group of Schedule II
drugs that are commonly abused, PDMPs can prevent patients from being
identified if they take unique combinations of medications tailored to a specific
set of conditions that are unique to that individual.
262 See Kam, supra note 51.
263 See supra Part IV.A.
264 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977); Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v.
Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 135-36 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
265 See United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012).
266 See Robert Lowes, 14 Florida Physicians Indicted in 'Pill Mill' Bust, MEDSCAPE MED.
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/748811.
267 See Painkiller Crackdown, supra note 14.
268 See Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. at 135-36. The coding procedures used to ensure
confidentiality in this case could be used when law enforcement accesses PDMP data to protect
the confidentiality of patients. Id. at 136.
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Law enforcement could use this type of information to establish the
probable cause necessary to get a warrant for the personally identifiable
information without violating the privacy rights of innocent patients. De-
identified health information is often already reported for regulatory purposes,
such as tracking public health trends and ensuring the proper and efficient
dispensation of public healthcare funds.269
By giving law enforcement limited access to this type of information,
the privacy rights of patients and the need for law enforcement can be
effectively balanced. It may require some extra work by law enforcement
agencies when investigating patients, but easing the workload of law
enforcement is not a justification for invading the privacy of individuals
because there is no end to the invasions of privacy such a justification would
allow. And, any extra work would likely be minimal under the scheme
described above. Because patients' have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their personally identifiable PDMP data, the Fourth Amendment requires that
law enforcement obtain a warrant before accessing personally identifiable
PDMP data. Allowing law enforcement to access de-identified data in a manner
described above can quell any concerns by law enforcement, if they fear they
won't have sufficient access to these potentially powerful tools for
investigating drug crimes, while protecting patient privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prescription drug abuse is an increasingly prevalent problem in the
United States with far reaching consequences. 270 Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs are an effective and necessary way to prevent and control the
diversion and abuse of prescription drugs.27 ' Almost every state has
implemented a PDMP,272 and the federal government has stood behind this
initiative.273 Although PDMPs are necessary, their existence presents a
potentially significant invasion on patient privacy. 274 This invasion of privacy is
most egregious when a law enforcement agency, solely for law enforcement
purposes, can access PDMP information without first obtaining a warrant.
Patients have a legitimate privacy interest in their personal prescription
information, as they do in other personal health information, and the need for
law enforcement does not, by itself, outweigh this privacy interest.275
269 See id.
270 See supra Part I.
271 See supra Part II.B.
272 NAMSDL, supra note 2 1, at 6.
273 See BLUMENSCHEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
274 See supra Part II.C.
275 See supra Part IV.
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In addition to requiring law enforcement to get a warrant, states should
be encouraged to include other privacy protections within their PDMPs, and
some already do.276 States should specifically exempt PDMP data from public
records laws, and create civil and/or criminal penalties for the wrongful access,
use, and disclosure of PDMP data. By taking these measures, states can
demonstrate a commitment to protecting patient privacy, and likely improve
public confidence that private health information will not be disclosed
wrongfully. States could also benefit financially, or at least help offset the cost
of implementing their PDMPs, by imposing their own penalties, as opposed to
federal penalties under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.277 Furthermore, there are
commonly used methods to protect patient privacy 278 that could allow law
enforcement access to some PDMP data without violating this privacy interest.
Thus, the privacy interests of patients and the government's interests in
enforcing its laws can be effectively balanced.
Therefore, patients have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their
personally identifiable PDMP data, and the Fourth Amendment requires that
law enforcement obtain a warrant before accessing personally identifiable
PDMP data. Our health is one of our most personal and private traits, often
outside of our control, embarrassing, or potentially damaging to our
reputation.279 To allow the government to invade this privacy without first
justifying its intrusion based on a showing of probable cause stands directly
against the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. If government
agents cannot search our physical medicine cabinets without getting a warrant,
they should not be able to search PDMPs, our virtual medicine cabinets,
without doing the same. Our doctors and pharmacists should be the only ones
minding our meds, not law enforcement.
Devon T. Unger*
276 NAMSDL, supra note 21, at 36-37.
277 See supra Part IV.C.
278 See Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 135 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
279 Complaint in Intervention, supra note 61, at 13.
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